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An urn-ball matching model of directed search is analyzed in which the usual
assumption of commitment to posted wages is dropped. One-on-one matches
lead to a Nash bargained wage but when multiple applicants arrive compe-
tition drives the workers down to their continuation value.
A minimum wage can act as a commitment device when (as in the USA)
willful underpayment carries a sti⁄er penalty than ￿inadvertent￿underpay-
ment. The theory sheds new light on why ￿rms appear to voluntarily bind
themselves into paying higher wages than they would otherwise pay. Robust-
ness to various sources of heterogeneity is considered1 Introduction
This paper explores the idea that ￿rms use labor market institutions such as
the minimum wage or labor unions as commitment devices to avoid paying
low wages. Essentially, if ￿rms cannot commit to a particular wage, compe-
tition among applicants drives the wage down. In such a market, a ￿rm that
can credibly commit to a higher wage will attract more applicants. More
applicants mean vacancies can be ￿lled faster and with better workers, the
bene￿t of which can outweigh the increased cost of labor.
Non-compliance with the minimum wage in the USA is signi￿cant and
persistent. Ashenfelter and Smith [1979] was the ￿rst serious attempt to
measure the extent of noncompliance. More recently, Eckstein et al [2005]
estimate a structural search-based model of the labor market to back out
a measure of non-compliance. While they are 25 years apart and based on
di⁄erent data sets, both studies reveal that between 30 and 40 % of those
workers who should receive the minimum wage are underpaid. Yet another
di⁄erent data source was used by Holtzer et al [1991] who look at application
rates at jobs paying below, at and above the minimum wage. The rate of
noncompliance in their sample (after removing workers in exempt industries)
is 25%.
Despite this evidence, these studies provide no real discussion as to the
cause of non-compliance. Actually, the question raised here is why do any
￿rms comply? The regulation stipulates that workers can be awarded a
maximum of twice the backpay for up to 2 years if they lodge a successful
complaint against their employer. Only when there is ￿willful￿or repeated
disregard of the law is there any criminal penalty incurred by the ￿rm.1
1See http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide/minwage.htm
1While the minimum wage provides a simple example for analytical pur-
poses, perhaps the clearest instances of the kind of behavior highlighted here
are of voluntary recognition of unions. While unions provide many other ser-
vices to workers it is well established that they also provide a wage premium
(see Booth [1995]). Some evidence on voluntary recognition of unions in the
USA comes from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
[2004] p. 18. It reports that of the 1,311 initial contract cases assigned to
federal mediators in FY 2004, 258 were assigned from certi￿cation sources
other than the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ￿such as voluntary
recognitions￿ . How many of these are truly voluntary is not reported but
these ￿gures do understate the proportion of non-NLRB certi￿cations. This
is because only NLRB certi￿cations are necessarily referred to the FMCS.
For the UK, Central Arbitration Committee [2004] does report voluntary
recognitions. At any stage in the formal proceedings, employers can choose
to voluntarily recognize unions. Between 2000 and 2004, of 361 applications
for recognition, 85 were accepted by employers without a ballot.
As directed search explicitly incorporates the application decision of work-
ers, it provides a natural environment to address the issue of why ￿rms might
associate themselves with institutions that lead to paying higher wages than
they would otherwise pay.2 Essentially, if there is a large number of workers
and vacancies in a market and, in any period, workers apply to a subset of
the vacancies, then the number of applicants at any one vacancy can be de-
scribed by a discrete probability distribution which puts positive probability
on no applicants at all. The usual approach assumes that ￿rms can commit
to posted wages and that workers can direct their applications accordingly.
2See Rogerson et al [2005] for more background to this approach to modelling the labor
market.
2In the absence of any coordination mechanism, it is assumed that homoge-
neous workers follow symmetric strategies. In equilibrium, workers will be
indi⁄erent across applying to each ￿rm and attach a probability of apply-
ing to each which depends on the characteristics (including the wage) of the
vacancy.
The central theoretical deviation from the literature of this work is that
￿rms cannot commit to posted wages. Knowing this workers duly ignore
them. Julien et al [2005a] assert that ￿rms rarely post wages. Here, the
issue is moot, when the set of applicants is realized, wage formation will
occur without regard to whatever wage was posted. In the baseline model
with homogeneous ￿rms and workers, I assume that when there is only one
applicant the wage is negotiated. Otherwise, one worker is hired at random
from the pool of applicants with a wage equal to the workers￿continuation
value. In general, it is well known that such a mechanism for wage formation
may be suboptimal from the perspective of the ￿rm. The point here is to look
into when ￿rms might use labor market institutions such as the minimum
wage as a commitment device to prevent themselves from paying wages that
are too low.
Wages can be too low from the ￿rms￿perspective if the implied increase in
the application rate from raising wages outweighs the increased cost of labor.
It is shown that as long as ￿rms retain some bargaining power in the one-on-
one matches, there is always a binding minimum wage to which ￿rms would
like to commit. It should be clear how recognition of a union could represent
a commitment to a particular wage structure. It is less obvious however,
that o⁄ering the minimum wage carries any more commitment than o⁄ering
any other wage. The assertion here is that (at least in the USA) if ￿rms
declare themselves to be minimum wage payers, subsequent violation of the
3regulation would be deemed willful. In that case the employer, as mentioned
above, will be subject to criminal prosecution.
Further support for this model of minimum wage compliance is provided
by Holtzer et al [1991]. They ￿nd that the number of applicants for jobs
paying the minimum wage was higher than for jobs paying either just above
or just below the minimum wage. The data set they used only reports the
realized wage. In the model, the whole point of o⁄ering the minimum wage is
to increase the size of the pool of applicants. A prediction therefore, is that
(on average) ￿rms o⁄ering the minimum wage will have more applicants than
similar ￿rms which do not. Also, as the only reason to pay more than the
minimum wage would be that only one applicant showed up, the number of
applicants for jobs paying more than the minimum wage is necessarily small.
In reality, the number of applicants to the high wage jobs was not precisely
one. What Holtzer et al [1991] did ￿nd was that those jobs were typically
occupied by better quali￿ed workers - presumably, those whose continuation
values exceeded the minimum wage. Some discussion of how to adapt the
environment to incorporate heterogeneity and how this might change the
results is provided in Section 3 of the paper.
When ￿rms can commit to wages, the allocation under directed search
is e¢ cient (see Moen [1997], Sattinger [1990]). If the prevailing wage were
something other than the e¢ cient wage as identi￿ed by Hosios (1990), ￿rms
could always make a market at a wage closer to it in which both workers and
￿rms are better o⁄. The freedom to make markets causes the externalities
that exist in the matching framework to be internalized by the ￿rms so that
what is good for them is good for the economy. In the baseline model of
this paper, e¢ ciency pertains when workers get all the surplus in one-on-one
matches. As mentioned above, this is precisely when the there is no strictly
4binding minimum wage to which ￿rms would like to commit. An implication
of this is that when workers do not have all of the bargaining power minimum
wage policy can improve welfare even under voluntary adoption.
Related theoretical work is provided by Julien et al [2005a,b]. The ￿rst
of these papers looks at what happens when wages are determined after
￿rms and workers meet. Firms can contact at most one worker and workers
auction their services among those ￿rms that contact them. They show that
this arrangement causes e¢ cient vacancy creation. The second paper shows
that more generally, any mechanism that assigns the match surplus to the
contacting agent in any encounter leads to a socially optimal allocation. If
the contacting agent is the worker, this means that when there is a one-on-one
meeting, the worker gets all the surplus. When more than one worker applies
to the same job, there is no surplus - workers get their continuation value.
This coincides with the special case of the wage formation in this paper in
which the worker has all the bargaining power in one-on-one meetings. Coles
and Eeckhout [2003] also look at the possibility of ￿rms choosing from a
larger class of mechanisms. They ￿nd that simple wage posting as in Moen
[1997] can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. The main di⁄erence
between all of these papers and the baseline model presented here is that
they all impose some degree of commitment to a wage formation mechanism
by individuals on one side of the market. The idea here is that the bargaining
protocol is simply a cultural norm.
Most of the prior work on directed search has been focussed on the the-
oretical development of the framework (see Rogerson et al [2004]). An ex-
ception to this has been Acemoglu and Shimer [1999] who show that with
risk-averse workers, unemployment insurance (UI) can increase output. Es-
sentially, they show that the investment decisions of ￿rms is in￿ uenced by
5the search decisions of workers. Workers will look for more productive jobs if
they are insured against long periods of unemployment. Consequently, ￿rms
create fewer but more productive jobs in the presence of a UI system than
they would in the absence of UI. The net e⁄ect for moderate UI coverage is
an increase in economic output.
While in principle, the argument put forward in this paper applies to
any institution that permits ￿rms to commit to paying higher wages than it
otherwise would, for simplicity the analysis is restricted to the example of
the minimum wage. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays
out the baseline model with homogeneous workers and ￿rms. The model is
analyzed in 3 versions: without minimum wages, with compulsory minimum
wages and with voluntary adoption of the minimum wage. Section 3 considers




The discrete time in￿nite horizon economy comprises a continuum of ex ante
homogeneous in￿nite lived workers and ￿rms. Workers who get jobs are
replaced by new entrants to the market so that the mass of unemployed
workers is ￿xed; normalized to 1. Both workers and ￿rms are risk neutral
and discount the future at a rate r per period. Workers experience utility
from leisure at the rate b per period.
Firms can create as many atomistic vacancies as they like but have to pay
an advertising cost a per period that the vacancy is held open. The mass
6of vacancies, v, is controlled by a zero-pro￿t condition. If they so wish, a
￿rm can assign a wage or range of wages to a particular vacancy. The wage
so assigned becomes common knowledge to all market participants. When
a ￿rm hires a worker to a vacancy, the match produces p > b units of the
perfectly divisible (perishable) consumption good per period. Consumption
of one unit of the good provides one unit of utility to ￿rms or workers.
Within any time period, ￿rms post vacancies and then workers simul-
taneously apply to whichever job they like but they are restricted to one
application per period.3 The main informational restriction is that, as work-
ers apply simultaneously they do not know precisely how many others have
applied for any particular vacancy. Following Burdett et al [2001], I assume
that the number of applicants for any particular vacancy in any period is a
random variable with a Poisson distribution. (This emerges as the limiting
distribution of applicants as the economy grows large and workers follow a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.) The appropriate parameter for the
Poisson distribution is q; the expected queue length or number of applicants
per vacancy. If vacancies are completely indistinguishable, q = 1=v: Specif-
ically, for a vacancy with expected queue length, q; the implied probability
that it will receive exactly n applications is qne￿q=n!; for n = 0;1;2:::When
vacancies di⁄er, the expected queue lengths adjust so that workers are indif-
ferent across vacancy types supporting their propensity to randomize.
So far, the environment I have described is the large market version of the
model of Burdett et al [2001] adapted to a labor market context (see Roger-
son et al [2005]). The point of departure from standard directed search is
3This restriction can be relaxed. Albrecht et al [2005] study a directed search envi-
ronment with multiple applications. As long as workers do not apply to every opening in
every period there is a non-degerate distribution of applicants across vacancies.
7that I do not assume that ￿rms can commit to posted wages. Instead here,
wage formation depends on the realized match con￿guration. When 2 or
more workers apply to the same vacancy, the ￿rm hires one worker, chosen
at random, at a wage equal to the workers￿(￿ ow) continuation value. The
workers are clearly indi⁄erent between employment and continued unemploy-
ment at this wage and I assume the worker takes the job. One can think of
this wage as emerging from (unmodelled) rounds of Bertrand competition
between workers. Where meetings are one-on-one, the ￿rm and worker use
generalized Nash bargaining in which the parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] represents the
bargaining power of the worker. In terms of the allocation, the wage that
any ￿rm might post is immaterial. Wage posting does not, therefore, feature
in the description of equilibrium.4
For the workers, the probability that they get to bargain their wage is
equal to the number of vacancies multiplied by the probability that any









Let the asset value to unemployment be V: By assumption, the value to
meeting a ￿rm with more than one applicant is V whether the worker gets
the job or not. Thus,








4There is an issue as to whether the ￿rm is simply committing to the Nash bargaining
outcome instead of the posted wage. The view put forward here is that when there is a
surplus to be divided the Nash bargaining outcome represents a cultural norm. (When
there are multiple homogeneous applicants, competition means that there is nothing to
bargain over.)
8where, ^ w is the bargained wage and the non-bargained wage is rV:
The asset value to holding open a vacancy, Vf; is obtained from:
rVf = ￿a + qe
￿q
￿














The (￿ ow) match surplus for one-on-one meetings is p ￿ rV ￿ rVf: Nash
bargaining leads to the workers getting a share ￿ of this in addition to their
continuation value, rV: As long as the surplus is positive
^ w = ￿ (p ￿ rVf) + (1 ￿ ￿)rV (3)
If the match surplus is strictly negative there is no match.
A zero-pro￿t equilibrium is a mass of vacancies, v￿; such that q = q￿ ￿
(1=v￿) solves (2) with Vf = 0 where ^ w and V are obtained from (1) and (3).




; ^ w =
￿p(e￿q + r) + (1 ￿ ￿)rb
￿e￿q + r
(4)
As p > b; one-on-one match surplus is always positive: This also shows that
for any given value of q; ￿ = 1 means ^ w = p and ￿ = 0 means ^ w = rV = b:
Otherwise, p > ^ w > rV > b: Substituting for V and ^ w into (2) and setting
Vf = 0 yields the following implicit expression for the equilibrium queue
length, q￿:
a = (p ￿ b)
￿




As q varies from 0 to 1; the expression
￿
1 ￿ e￿q (1 + ￿q)
￿e￿q + r
￿
increases strictly monotonically from 0 to 1=r: Existence of equilibrium there-
fore requires that ra < p￿b: This is because no matter how tight the market,
9the ￿rms have to incur the advertising cost for at least one period. Strict
monotonicity ensures that whenever the equilibrium exists it is unique.
Clearly, an increase in a or b or a decrease in p causes the equilibrium
queue length to increase as ￿rms produce less vacancies. The parameter r
here is inversely related to the "thickness" of the market. In thicker markets,
the meeting rate is higher so that the extent of discounting between possible
meetings is lower. As ￿rms expect to ￿ll their openings more quickly, va-
cancies become e⁄ectively cheaper to create which leads to a decrease in the
expected number of workers per vacancy.
2.2 Minimum wage with full enforcement
Let the value to unemployment when all ￿rms comply with a minimum wage,
￿ w; be ￿ V : The minimum wage binds when it exceeds the workers￿￿ ow con-
tinuation value; r￿ V : When it does not bind, the market is identical to that
without a minimum wage and ￿ V = V as derived above. The analysis there-
fore only considers the case in which ￿ w > rV .
There is some question as to how Nash bargaining should be applied in
this circumstance. As long as the workers threatpoint is r￿ V ; the Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom means that while ￿ w lies between r￿ V
and ^ w the minimum wage will not directly in￿ uence the outcome of the bar-
gaining.5 The question is really whether the worker￿ s threatpoint should be
r￿ V or ￿ w: A minimum wage paying ￿rm has no obligation to hire a worker.
Rather, the obligation is that if the worker is hired, the wage to be paid must
be at least ￿ w: Because of this, the relevant threatpoint should be r￿ V as this
is all the worker can base his negotiations on. The worker cannot demand
5See Osborne and Rubinstein [1990] for a complete exposition of Nash bargaining.
10that as a last resort he be hired at ￿ w: Consequently, if ￿ Vf represents the value
to holding open a minimum wage vacancy and ￿ w < ￿
￿
p ￿ r￿ Vf
￿
+(1￿￿)r￿ V ;
then ^ w = ￿
￿
p ￿ r￿ Vf
￿
+(1￿￿)r￿ V : It is possible, however, that the minimum
wage is so high that ￿ w > ￿
￿
p ￿ r￿ Vf
￿
+(1￿￿)r￿ V : In this case, the minimum
wage becomes a relevant alternative as the parties cannot agree (by law) to
match at a wage below ￿ w: In general, we have




p ￿ r￿ Vf
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)r￿ V ; ￿ w
￿
(6)
When ^ w = ￿ w; the minimum wage is completely binding otherwise it is termed
partially binding.6 The circumstances under which the minimum wage can
bind completely are discussed below.
Given an expected queue length, ￿ q; the number of ￿rms who end up with
2 or more applicants in a given time period is
￿
1 ￿ e
￿￿ q ￿ ￿ qe
￿￿ q￿
￿ v
where ￿ v is the mass of vacancies. As ￿ v = 1=￿ q; and the number of workers
hired by ￿rms with more than one applicant equals the number of ￿rms that
get more than one applicant, we have
r￿ V = b + e
￿￿ q
￿





1 ￿ (1 + ￿ q)e￿￿ q
￿ q
￿￿





r￿ Vf = ￿a + ￿ qe
￿￿ q
￿





1 ￿ (1 + ￿ q)e
￿￿ q￿￿




A zero-pro￿t equilibrium here is a mass of vacancies, ￿ v￿; such that ￿ q =
￿ q￿ ￿ 1=￿ v￿ solves (8) with ￿ Vf = 0:
6Notice that had I used ￿ w as the worker￿ s threatpoint during negotiations, the minimum
wage would never completely bind and the environment would be analytically simpler.
11Two types of equilibria are possible: equilibria with a partially binding
minimum wage and equilibria with a completely binding minimum wage.
Straightforward algebra reveals that for partially binding minimum wages,
￿ q￿ solves
ra =
(p ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿)r￿ q2e￿￿ q + (p ￿ ￿ w)[1 ￿ (1 + ￿ q)e￿￿ q][r￿ q + 1 ￿ e￿￿ q]
￿ q(￿e￿￿ q + r) + 1 ￿ (1 + ￿ q)e￿￿ q (9)
For completely binding minimum wages, ￿ q￿ solves
ra = (p ￿ ￿ w)(1 ￿ e
￿￿ q): (10)
Neither of these equilibria can exist when p ￿ ￿ w < ra: Straight forward
algebra shows that multiple equilibria of either type cannot occur.
Uniqueness of either equilibrium, however, does not rule out coexistence.
Imposing
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)r￿ V = ￿ w (11)
along with the set of equations that characterize equilibrium with partially
binding minimum wage yields the upper bound on the values of ￿ w for which
that type of equilibrium exists. Imposing the same equality on the set of equa-
tions that characterize equilibrium with completely binding minium wages
will similarly yield the lower bound on the set of values of ￿ w for which that
equilibrium type exists. Continuity of ^ w in ￿ w (from equation (6)) ensures
that the resulting critical values for the existence of either type of equilib-
rium are the same. These equilibrium types, therefore, do not coexist which
means that equilibrium is unique.
To ascertain which equilibrium type is relevant for any given parameter
con￿guration, let wT be the threshold value of the minimum wage which just
completely binds. That is wT = ￿ w such that equations (7), (10), and (11) all
12hold. Eliminating r￿ V yields
￿ w =
￿p[r￿ q + 1 ￿ e￿￿ q] + (1 ￿ ￿)r￿ qb
[r￿ q + ￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿ q)]
(12)
ra = (p ￿ ￿ w)(1 ￿ e
￿￿ q) (13)
As ￿ q increases, equation (12) generates a monotonically decreasing value of
￿ w which approaches ￿ w = ￿p+(1￿￿)b as ￿ q gets large. Meanwhile, equation
(13) generates a monotonically increasing value of ￿ w which approaches p￿ra
as ￿ q gets large. So, as long as




wT exists and it is unique. A minimum wage larger than wT; that is consistent
with equilibrium (i.e. p ￿ ￿ w > ra), will be fully binding. A minimum wage
below wT will only partially bind.
When condition (14) does not hold, there is no value of the minimum
wage such that it completely binds in equilibrium. Thus, given p ￿ b > ra;
for su¢ ciently large values of ￿ only partially binding equilibria are possible.
When ￿ = 0; wT = b and a minimum wage that binds at all binds completely.
Beyond that, it is straightforward to show that, while it continues to exist,
wT strictly increases with ￿: Moreover, from the de￿nition of ^ w; it should be
clear that for ￿ > 0; wT > rV so there is always some range of minimum
wages which will only partially bind.
2.3 Voluntary adoption of the minimum wage
The issue considered here is whether a ￿rm might prefer to adopt the mini-
mum wage if the associated legal framework imbues su¢ cient credibility. It
is therefore assumed that when a ￿rm declares itself a minimum wage payer,
13violation of the law is considered willful. And, the penalty for willful viola-
tion is su¢ ciently punitive that no ￿rm adopting the minimum wage will ever
violate the law. Firms can, however, completely ignore the law. The penalty
for underpayment in that case is assumed to be insigni￿cant. Throughout
this analysis, the value of the minimum wage, ￿ w; remains exogenous to the
￿rms. Firms simply choose whether to adopt the minimum wage or not.
Let ￿ represent the propensity with which an individual ￿rm adopts the
minimum wage. If ￿ represents the propensity with which all other ￿rms
adopt the minimum wage, an equilibrium in this extended environment is
a ￿
￿ 2 f0;1g such that ￿
￿ = ￿ is each individual ￿rm￿ s optimal adoption
choice. Equilibrium is therefore restricted to pure strategy, symmetric Nash.
(The possibility of ￿rms using mixed strategy equilibria is considered be-
low.) Under this restriction, two types of equilibrium are possible, ￿
￿ = 0
and ￿
￿ = 1. Clearly, the values to being in equilibrium with ￿
￿ = 0 are
precisely those that pertain in the equilibrium in the basic environment de-
scribed above. Similarly, the values to being in equilibrium with ￿
￿ = 1 are
precisely those that pertain in equilibrium when the ￿rms are fully compliant.
The issue here, then, is for what values of ￿ w is either outcome described in
the preceding subsections an equilibrium of the extended environment with
optional compliance?
Let ~ Vf be the value to creating a minimum wage vacancy (￿ = 1) when
all other vacancies are non-minimum wage (￿ = 0). Then,
r~ Vf = ￿a + ~ qe
￿~ q
￿







￿~ q ￿ ~ qe
￿~ q￿￿










p ￿ r~ Vf
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)rV; ￿ w
o
(16)
and ~ q is the expected number of applicants at the ￿rm o⁄ering the minimum
14wage, ￿ w: As workers are fully aware of the characteristics of all vacancies,
they apply to the deviant ￿rm in such numbers that makes them indi⁄erent
between applying to the minimum wage vacancy and all the other vacancies.
The value of ~ q is therefore obtained from
rV = b + e
￿~ q
￿





1 ￿ (1 + ~ q)e￿~ q
~ q
￿￿




where V has the same value that emerged in the basic model without min-
imum wages. Noncompliance, ￿ = ￿ = 0; is an equilibrium if and only if
~ Vf ￿ Vf = 0:
For full-compliance ￿ = ￿ = 1 to be an equilibrium, ￿rms should not
prefer deviation to noncompliance. Let e ￿ V f be the value to noncompliance
(￿ = 0) when all other vacancies comply (￿ = 1) with the minimum wage,
￿ w. Then,
re ￿ V f = ￿a +e ￿ qe
￿e ￿ q
￿
p ￿ e ￿ w
r





￿e ￿ q ￿ qe
￿e ￿ q
i￿
p ￿ r￿ V
r




e ￿ w = ￿
￿
p ￿ re ￿ V f
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)r￿ V (19)
is calculated using r￿ V as the worker￿ s threat point and e ￿ q is the expected
number of applicants at the noncompliant ￿rm. Workers apply to the deviant
￿rm in such numbers that they are indi⁄erent across all vacancies. The value
of e ￿ q is therefore obtained from
r￿ V = b + e
￿e ￿ q




Compliance, ￿ = ￿ = 1; is an equilibrium if and only if e ￿ V f ￿ ￿ Vf = 0:
Claim 1 Under the parameter restrictions required for existence of equilibria
in the basic environment and under minimum wage with full enforcement,
15either ￿
￿ = 0 or ￿
￿ = 1 type equilibria exist under voluntary compliance.
These equilibrium types do not generically coexist.
Proof. The boundary to the set of parameter values for which ￿
￿ = 0 is an
equilibrium is de￿ned by ~ Vf = Vf = 0: The boundary to the set of parameter
values for which ￿
￿ = 1 is an equilibrium is de￿ned by e ￿ V f = ￿ Vf = 0: After
substituting these values into the appropriate equations above (respectively
(1), (2), (3), (15), (16), (17) and (7), (8), (9), (18), (19), (20)), simple inspec-
tion reveals that the two boundaries are identical. On the common boundary
these equilibria coexist. Smoothness of the functional forms ensures that the
boundary is non-generic (zero measure) in the permissible parameter space.
In particular this means that a minimum wage that any ￿rms voluntarily
adopt will be adopted by all ￿rms. Furthermore, any value of the minimum
wage at which ￿rms are indi⁄erent between adoption and non-adoption, the
proportion of ￿rms choosing to adopt does not a⁄ect the workers￿continu-
ation value, i.e. V = ￿ V : This is because for ￿rms to be indi⁄erent between
adoption and non-adoption Vf = ￿ Vf = 0 and the associated queue length
from o⁄ering the minimum wage when every other ￿rm does, is the same as
when no other ￿rm o⁄ers it.
Claim 1 also explains why possible mixed strategy equilibria were ignored.
By de￿nition, in any mixed strategy equilibrium ￿rms have to be indi⁄erent
between adoption and non-adoption of the minimum wage. This means that
mixed strategy equilibria only occur at those critical parameter values for
which both pure strategy equilibria also exist. At those parameter values
there is a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria indexed by the proportion
of ￿rms adopting the minimum wage.
16The foregoing does not prove that the ￿
￿ = 1 type equilibrium ever exists.
Claim 2 addresses this question.
Claim 2 For every ￿ < 1; there exists a minimum wage, ￿ w, su¢ ciently close
to rV such that the unique equilibrium under voluntary adoption is ￿
￿ = 1
Proof. From Claim 1, we simply have to show that for low enough ￿ w; ￿
￿ = 0
is not an equilibrium when ￿ < 1: This requires that individual ￿rms would
￿nd it pro￿table to adopt the minimum wage when all other ￿rms do not. A
deviant ￿rm will adopt some ￿ w > rV as long as
d~ Vf
d ￿ w
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ w=rV
> 0:
Restricting attention to partially binding minimum wages, substituting
for ~ w from (16) into (15) and (17) yields the following pair of equations in
~ Vf and ~ q:
G
1(~ Vf; ~ q; ￿ w) ￿ r
2~ Vf + ra ￿ ~ qe
￿~ q(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
p ￿ rV ￿ r~ Vf
￿
￿ (1 ￿ e
￿~ q ￿ ~ qe
￿~ q)
￿




2(~ Vf; ~ q; ￿ w) ￿ r
2~ qV ￿ r~ qb ￿ ~ qe
￿~ q￿
￿
p ￿ r~ Vf ￿ rV
￿
￿ (1 ￿ e
￿~ q ￿ ~ qe
￿~ q)(￿ w ￿ rV ) = 0














￿ ￿ ￿ ￿







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
17where Gi
j represents the partial derivative of the ith component of G with
respect to the jth argument. Obtaining each of the partial derivatives is
straightforward. Once they have been obtained, we can impose ￿ w = rV;








(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ e￿q￿ ￿ q￿e￿q￿)
r￿q￿(r + 1 ￿ ￿e￿q￿)
which is strictly positive while ￿ < 1 and q￿ is ￿nite.
As the preceding analysis was carried out for partially binding minimum
wages, it is only valid for ￿ > 0:When ￿ = 0; ^ w = rV = b and a minimum
wage that binds at all binds completely. In that case substituting for ~ w = ￿ w
into (15) and (17) yields
r~ Vf = ￿a +
(1 ￿ e￿~ q)
r
￿
p ￿ ￿ w ￿ r~ Vf
￿
rV = b +
￿
1 ￿ e￿~ q
~ q
￿￿






r + 1 ￿ e
￿~ q￿ d~ Vf
d ￿ w
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ w=rV
= e













￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ w=rV
=
1 ￿ e￿~ q
rV ￿ b
As rV = b; deviation to a minimum wage that just binds generates an un-
bounded queue length of applicants and any ￿rm would choose to adopt the
minimum wage.
The gist of the proof is that, if the value to posting the minimum wage
when no one else does is increasing at the point where it just begins to bind,
then for some range of values of ￿ w su¢ ciently close to rV; ￿
￿ = 0 cannot be an
18equilibrium: From Claim 1, this implies that over that range, the equilibrium
is of type ￿
￿ = 1:
The intuition is clearest in the ￿ = 0 case. Because workers get at least
b whether they apply to the minimum wage job or not, every unemployed
worker might as well apply. By o⁄ering the minimum wage, the deviant ￿rm
will ￿ll its job with probability 1 while incurring an in￿nitesimal increase in
the wage. When ￿ > 0; minimum wage jobs will still attract more work-
ers but to a lesser extent than occurs under ￿ = 0: This is because, while
^ w > ￿ w workers experience some opportunity cost from applying to minimum
wage jobs. They have to trade o⁄ the improved outcome when there are
multiple applicants with the reduced probability of getting to negotiate their
wage. While ￿ is small, ^ w is close to rV and the former e⁄ect dominates
so that queue length increases rapidly with ￿ w: The impact of adoption on
the expected queue length continues to make adoption of low enough but
binding minimum wages worthwhile to ￿rms as long as ￿ < 1: Ultimately
when ￿ = 1; the deviant prefers not to implement any binding minimum
wage. Here, the increased probability of multiple applicants exactly o⁄sets
the increased cost of the wage bill.
2.4 Welfare
As both workers and ￿rms are risk neutral, welfare in the model amounts to
output minus costs. However, in order to focus on match formation, there
are no separations in this model which means that total output is always
growing. Welfare comparisons amount to comparing di⁄erent economies and
the welfare measure is the value to being born in any economy.
Regardless of the method of wage formation or the implied distribution,
free-entry of vacancies means that any payments ￿rms receive simply com-
19pensate them for vacancy creation costs. Welfare is therefore the utility
contribution of a birth minus the associated vacancy cost.
If Vb is the present value of utility generated by a birth then







For each worker there are v = 1=q vacancies which cost a=q to maintain over
the expected duration of the workers job search period. If Cb represents the








the ￿ ow value of welfare is then W ￿ rVb + rCb: That is
W =
(1 ￿ e￿q)(p ￿ b) ￿ ra
rq + 1 ￿ e￿q + b
It is simple to show that in the absence of a minimum wage, W = rV:7 In
the minimum wage with full enforcement, W = r￿ V :8 Because of free entry,
the ￿rms wash out of the welfare calculation.
The ￿rst order condition from maximization of W with respect to q im-






= a(r + e
￿q) (21)
As W 00(qp) is negative, W(:) is quasi-concave meaning that the unique so-
lution to (21) is a global optimum. Under the maintained assumption that
p ￿ b > ra (required for existence of equilibrium), qp always exists.
Comparison of equations (21) and (5). shows that if ￿ = 1; then qp = q￿:
Of course, ￿ is a deep parameter of the model and not directly controlled
7Set Vf = 0 in equation (2) and add it to equation (1)
8Set Vf = 0 in equation (8) and add it to equation (7)
20by policy. A second question, therefore, is whether the minimum wage can
achieve optimality for a given value of ￿: This amounts to asking whether
minimum wage policy can implement ￿ q = qp: Recall that from equations
(10) and (9) ￿ q is continuous and strictly increasing in ￿ w: When ￿ w = rV
￿ q = q￿ < qp: As ￿ w approaches p ￿ ra; ￿ q approaches in￿nity. So, there exists
a unique value of ￿ w at which ￿ q = qp:
Of greater interest for the purpose of this paper is whether ￿rms will
voluntarily adopt a Pareto improving minimum wage.
Lemma 3 Full enforcement of a minimum wage that just binds is welfare
improving
Proof. We need to show that
dW
d ￿ w












d ￿ w > 0 for all ￿ w was established earlier. The sign of dW
dq is the same as
that of ￿ where
￿ ￿ a(r + e





Evaluation of ￿ at q = q￿ implies







as long as ￿ < 1
As Claim 2 establishes that minimum wages su¢ ciently close to rV will
voluntarily be adopted it follows from Lemma 1 that voluntarily adopted
minimum wages can lead to e¢ ciency gains.
213 Heterogeneity
The preceding analysis provides an example of how ￿rms might adopt the
minimum wage as a commitment to not paying extremely low wages. This
section considers how the model could be extended to incorporate various
sources of heterogeneity in order to examine the extent to which this idea can
be generalized. Introducing heterogeneity of any form in such models vastly
complicates the analysis. Considered here are: ex ante di⁄erences across
￿rms, ex ante di⁄erences across workers (either in productivity or value of
leisure) and ex post (i.e. match speci￿c) heterogeneity. Whatever the source,
heterogeneity raises further questions about who knows what and when. And,
for each set of assumptions as to the nature of private information, there may
be many ways of modelling the determination of the terms-of-trade that are
consistent with the model described above. Consequently, it goes beyond the
scope of this paper to provide a complete analysis of each alternative.
3.1 Ex ante heterogeneity across ￿rms
A drawback of the model described so far is that either all ￿rms adopt the
minimum wage or none of them do. One way to address this clearly counter-
factual outcome is the introduction of vacancies for jobs that incorporate
di⁄erent technologies. In that way, the same worker may produce di⁄erent
amounts of output in di⁄erent jobs. The simplest way to model this is to
incorporate an initial job-creation cost and for the productivity to be realized
only after the cost has been incurred. This would be the same approach
used by Moen [1997]. In his model, ￿rms could commit to posted wages so
whether the worker knew the true productivity of the ￿rm was not an issue.
Here, because the terms of trade are determined after the workers and ￿rms
22meet, assumptions as to what the worker (or even the ￿rm) know about the
productivity of the job have to be made.
The simplest way forward is to assume that the productivity of the job
is common knowledge and is used by workers as a basis for directing their
search. In equilibrium the expected queue length at each vacancy type will
adjust so that workers are indi⁄erent between searching all active vacancy
types.9 In the absence of a minimum wage, one-on-one matches result in
a bargained wage which will re￿ ect the productivity of the job. If multi-
ple applicants show up, workers get pushed down to their common outside
option.
In this model the ￿rms￿choices are essentially the same as before. We
know from the previous analysis that ￿rms will voluntarily adopt a binding
minimum wage as long as it is not too high. Of course, "too high" is relative
to the productivity of the job. Su¢ ciently high productivity jobs will adopt
the minimum wage while low productivity ones will not.
Perhaps more interesting, but left for future work, is the possibility that
￿rm productivity is not observable (at least prior to the meeting). Firms in
that case might o⁄er the minimum wage as a signal of their productivity.
Then, even low productivity ￿rms may have to o⁄er the minimum wage in
order to attract enough workers to make the job viable.
9There is an implicit assumption here (as used by Moen [1997]) that vacancies with
su¢ ciently low productivity that they will never match, can be freely disposed of.
233.2 Ex ante heterogeneity across workers
Holtzer et al [1991] provide evidence on the number of applicants for jobs
that hire workers at wages close to the minimum wage. They ￿nd that:10
(i) queue lengths are longer for jobs paying the minimum wage than those
paying just below the minimum wage
(ii) queue lengths are longer for jobs paying the minimum wage than those
paying just above the minimum wage
(iii) those jobs that pay more than the minimum wage have longer queues
than those paying below.
The baseline model of this paper is consistent with the ￿rst and second
observations. The ￿rst follows because workers have to be indi⁄erent between
applying to minimum and non-minimum wage ￿rms. The second occurs
because workers only get more than the minimum wage when they are the
only worker to show up at that particular ￿rm. The third observation is
problematic. Firms that could commit to paying higher than minimum wages
would (on average) get more applicants than even the minimum wage ￿rms.
But without the ability to commit, they will only pay high wages if there is
only one applicant.
A clue as to how the model can be reconciled with the third observation is
provided by Holtzer et al [1991] when they examine the nature of the workers.
They ￿nd that,
...workers hired to minimum wages jobs are on average less
educated, younger, less experienced and more likely to be fe-
male than workers who are hired into low-paying jobs that pay
10The data they use comes from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project Survey.
This survey reports realized wages only. (There are no data collected on what the ￿rm
expected to pay.)
24more than the minimum wage, while workers with starting wages
less then the minimum wage have similar personal characteristics
and training to workers whose starting wage equals the minimum
wage.
Incorporating workers that have outside options that exceed the minimum
wage because, say, they have higher expected productivity as evidenced by
their quali￿cations could clearly lead to the kind of outcome required here.
Actually extending the model to include multiple worker types involves
some non-trivial modelling choices. Again the simplest informational arrange-
ment is that worker productivity is common knowledge.11 Even in that case,
wage formation requires further assumptions. What should be clear is that
with complete information matching should be e¢ cient. Whenever a higher
productivity worker and a lower productivity worker apply for the same job,
the high productivity worker will get hired. Also, regardless of how wages
are determined, higher productivity workers will attract higher wages than
their lower productivity counterparts. These facts combined will mean that
high productivity workers have higher outside options. If the minimum wage
is chosen so that it partially binds for low productivity workers but does not
bind at all for high productivity workers, ￿rms potentially paying below the
minimum wage can have shorter expected queue lengths than those who pay
more. Even still, in this model with heterogeneous workers and homogeneous
11If worker productivity is private information the high productivity workers would
need some way of separating themselves from the low productivity workers. If this is not
possible, the outside options of the workers would be the same and any binding minimum
wage would bind on everyone. But, as Holtzer et al [1991] were able to identify the workers
as coming from di⁄erent expected productivity groups, it seems reasonable to suppose that
prospective employers can too.
25￿rms, ￿rms o⁄ering the minimum wage would not coexist with those who do
not o⁄er it.
For all the facts identi￿ed by Holtzer et al [1991] to be realized in the same
equilibrium requires both worker and ￿rm heterogeneity. With assortative
matching, as found in the data, the market is essentially segmented and the
queue lengths at high paid jobs could well be lower than those for low paid
jobs.
3.3 Match-speci￿c heterogeneity
The model of the previous section provides a simple example of how ￿rms
can bene￿t from minimum wage adoption. The basic idea is that as long
as ￿rms are able to commit to the minimum-wage, the implied improvement
in application rate by workers makes adoption worthwhile. The increased
queue length increases the possibility for the ￿rms of ￿lling the vacancy more
quickly and at a lower wage. Another possible bene￿t from a higher applica-
tion rate is a better match. This sub-section investigates this possibility by
incorporating match-speci￿c heterogeneity.12
I assume that any encounter between a worker and a ￿rm generates a
draw of the match productivity, p; from a continuous distribution F with
support between p and ￿ p: If the variation across matches is attributed to
subjective assessments by the ￿rm as to how the worker would ￿t within the
organization, then the realized value of p should be private information to
the ￿rm.13
12Moen [2003] provides a model of directed search with match-speci￿c heterogeneity. In
his model, however, ￿rms always meet with a continuum of workers so that the size of the
applicant pool does not a⁄ect the realized match productivity.
13The heterogeneity could also emerge from non-pecuniary aspects of the job over which
26There are many wage formation mechanisms that are consistent with the
homogeneous worker/￿rm model. For concreteness, one example is analyzed
here. To explore the extent to which this extension provides an additional
incentive for ￿rms to voluntarily adopt the minimum wage, I will focus on
the case where workers have all the bargaining power in one-on-one matches.
That is, they get to make a take-it-or-leave-it wage o⁄er to the ￿rm. When
the realized queue length at any vacancy exceeds one, I assume the ￿rm gets
to hire the most productive worker at the workers￿common outside-option
value.14
Let G(:jq) represent the distribution function of the highest productivity
among the workers conditional on 2 or more of them showing up. It is
helpful to derive G and some of its properties before continuing with the
general analysis of this example. For a given realized queue length, n; the
probability that every realized productivity is below p is F n(p): For given
q; n has a Poisson distribution so that contingent on n ￿ 2; the probability





n!(1 ￿ e￿q ￿ qe￿q)
Clearly, as F n(p) < F(p), G(pjq) < F(p) for all q:
The second important property of G(:j:) is that of ￿rst-order stochastic
workers have preferences. In that case, the natural assumption is that the worker has the
private information. Such an arrangement, with random matching and wage posting, is
considered in Masters [1998].
14Perhaps a more internally consistent model of wage formation would be to have the
workers make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers which depend only on the number of other workers in
the realized queue. In that case, however, the wage distribution is di¢ cult to characterize
making the e⁄ect of a minimum wage hard to assess.
27dominance with respect to q: That is
@G(pjq)
@q
< 0: for p 2 (0;1)
To see why this is true, notice that we can also write
G(pjq) =
eqF(p) ￿ 1 ￿ qF (p)
eq ￿ 1 ￿ q
so that the sign of @G(pjq)=@q; after suppressing the argument in F is the
same as the sign of
￿(q;F) ￿
F(eqF ￿ 1)
eqF ￿ 1 ￿ qF
￿
eq ￿ 1
eq ￿ 1 ￿ q




(eqF ￿ 1)2 ￿ q2F 2eqF
(eqF ￿ 1 ￿ qF)
2 =
(eqF ￿ 1 + qFe
qF
2 )(eqF ￿ 1 ￿ qFe
qF
2 )
(eqF ￿ 1 ￿ qF)
2
the sign of which is the same as the sign of
￿(q;F) ￿ (e
qF ￿ 1 ￿ qFe
qF
2 )














So, ￿(q;F) > 0 for F > 0 which means for F < 1; @￿(q;F)=@F > 0 and
￿(q;F) < 0:
With the essential properties of G established, I move to the analysis of
the model. First, consider the workers￿choice. They have to pick a wage o⁄er
to make in the case of a single match but are otherwise indi⁄erent between
remaining unemployed and getting a job when there are multiple applicants.
28If V (w) is the present discounted expected value to o⁄ering wage w; the
relevant asset value equation is
rV (w) = b +
e￿q
r




Let ^ w indicate the wage in single matches (when they occur). Because of the
recursive nature of equation (22) it should be clear that workers will always
choose ^ w > rV: As F(:) has ￿nite support, ^ w has to exist. This is all that
matters for this exercise.














In this model a free-entry steady-state equilibrium is a tuple, fVf;V;q; ^ wg
such that q solves (23) with Vf = 0; and V = V (^ w): A necessary condition
for equilibrium is that ra < ￿ p ￿ b: This is because ￿rms need to be assured
of covering their up-front advertising cost, a; even when the number of ap-
plicants is expected to be unbounded. In the absence of restrictions on F;
multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out.15
For any equilibrium consider the value, ~ Vf; to an individual ￿rm of a
one-time option to o⁄er a minimum wage which exceeds rV and to which
the ￿rm can commit. As Vf = 0;











15A su¢ cient condition for V (w) to be concave is that F has a non-decreasing hazard,
f(y)=(1 ￿ F(y)): Concavity of V (w) ensures uniqueness of equilibrium.
29where ~ q; is the expected queue length associated with o⁄ering the minimum
wage.16 Workers will adjust their search behavior so as to be indi⁄erent
between applying to the ￿rm o⁄ering the minimum wage and all other ￿rms




(1￿F(^ w))(^ w￿rV )+
(1 ￿ e￿~ q ￿ ~ qe￿~ q)
r~ q
(1￿G(￿ wj~ q))(￿ w￿rV ) (25)
The continuation value of the worker and the ￿rm are not a⁄ected by this
option so, as long as ^ w > ￿ w; neither is ^ w:
Following the analysis of the basic model, we can now ask when ￿rms
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ w=rV
=
(1 ￿ e￿~ q ￿ ~ qe￿~ q)(1 ￿ G(￿ wj~ q))
r2V ￿ rb ￿ (1 ￿ ~ q)e￿~ q(1 ￿ F(^ w))(^ w ￿ rV )
16The last integral is obtained by integration by parts from
Z ￿ p
￿ w
(y ￿ ￿ w)dG(yj~ q)
30and using (22) to substitute for r2V ￿ rb;
d~ q
d￿ w
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ w=rV
=
(1 ￿ e￿~ q ￿ ~ qe￿~ q)(1 ￿ G(￿ wj~ q))
~ qe￿~ q(1 ￿ F(^ w))(^ w ￿ rV )
which is positive. Substituting back into (26) yields
d~ Vf
d ￿ w




(1 ￿ e￿~ q ￿ ~ qe￿~ q)(1 ￿ G(￿ wj~ q))
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+~ qe￿~ q R ￿ p













clearly depends on the sign of the contents of the curly
brackets. The last term is positive from because
@G(yj~ q)
@~ q < 0 as established
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(y ￿ ^ w)dF(y)
in which the contents of the square brackets can be written as
Z ￿ p
￿ w
(y ￿ ￿ w)dG(yj~ q) ￿
Z ￿ p
^ w




(y ￿ ￿ w)dG(yj~ q) ￿
Z ￿ p
￿ w




(F(y) ￿ G(yj~ q))dy > 0:







That is, for low enough values of the minimum wage, universal non-adoption
of the minimum wage cannot be an equilibrium.
31The foregoing implies that some ￿rms will adopt a binding minimum wage
su¢ ciently close to rV: Following analysis similar to that of Section 2, it is
straightforward to show that when the adoption choice is fully incorporated
into this version of the model, similar results transpire. That is, the intersec-
tion of set of parameter values at which all ￿rms adopt the minimum wage
with the set of parameter values at which no ￿rms adopt the minimum wage
is non-generic in the set of all permissible parameter values. In practical
terms this, combined with result (27), means that holding all other parame-
ters ￿xed, there is a critical value of the minimum wage below which all ￿rms
will adopt and above which no ￿rms will adopt.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a model of the labor market in which ￿rms use the
minimum wage as a commitment device. The point is to shed light on why
￿rms appear to voluntarily bind themselves to paying higher wages than they
would otherwise pay.
The essence of the argument is that ￿rms face a trade-o⁄between higher
labor costs from adopting a binding minimum wage and the improved appli-
cation rate that it implies. In the baseline model (homogenous jobs, workers
and matches) for minimum wages that just bind, the trade-o⁄ works in the
￿rms￿favour. This is because when there are multiple applicants, the ￿rms
only forfeit a small fraction of the match surplus while workers move from
receiving none of the surplus to receiving some of it. This means that the
application rate rises very quickly with the minimum wage and the improved
matching rate for ￿rms o⁄sets the higher labor cost. When there is match
speci￿c heterogeneity, there is an additional bene￿t from a larger pool of
32applicants - higher expected match quality. In both cases, the bene￿ts ac-
crue to the ￿rms because the adjustment in application rates leave workers
indi⁄erent as to where to apply.
A number of potential extensions of this framework have been alluded
to in the text. The possibility that ￿rms might o⁄er the minimum wage
as a signal of productivity or job security may well be worth investigating.
To verify the validity of such theories, though, requires more comprehensive
data on how ￿rms actually advertise their openings.
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